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AUDITOR SWITCHING AND
THE GREAT DEPRESSION
Abstract: This paper explores the pattern of auditor switching in
Canada before and during the Great Depression based on a sample
of 1,344 financial statements. Hierarchical log linear analysis shows
that there is a significant change in the pattern of switches. Prior to
the Depression, the contemporary pattern of auditor switching is observed; that is, there is a flow of clients from small to large audit firms
and from Canadian to international audit firms. During the Depression, however, this flow of clients is reversed with large international
firms losing clients through switches, on average, to Canadian and
smaller audit firms. The contemporary audit literature suggests possible reasons for the observed patterns in terms of the demand for
higher quality audits by clients and audit firms’ risk management of
potential client bankruptcy.

This paper explores changes in the pattern of auditor/client switching and continuity in Canada before and during the
Great Depression of the 1930s. The Great Depression has been
referred to as a “defining moment” in economic history [Bordo
et al., 1998]. It provides a setting that allows the market’s response to shocks to be assessed. The shock to the audit market
was twofold. First, the Depression exposed the securities market
manipulations of the late 1920s and made potential and current
investors aware of the importance of credible financial information for assessing the liquidity, solvency, and future earnings
potential of firms [Previts and Merino, 1979, p. 245]. This shock
increased the value of the audit as a signal of the quality and
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credibility of financial statements and, hence, provided incen
tives for client firms to switch to higher reputation auditors.
The second impact of the Depression was to increase dramatically the risk of financial distress and bankruptcy faced by
client firms and, derivatively, the risk of loss of reputation and
litigation for damages faced by auditors. Audit firms must assess
the risks posed by their portfolios of clients in order to ensure
their profitability and survival. This will involve a pre-engagement assessment of the risk of new clients and the resignation
from engagements with existing clients where the risk level has
become unacceptable. The Depression dramatically, if temporarily, increased the average risk level of auditors’ portfolios of
clients. This could result in auditor switches initiated by the auditor in order to maintain an acceptable level of risk in its portfolio of clients.
The Great Depression also coincided with significant
changes in the regulation of the audit market in some countries
[Edwards, 1989]. In the U.S., the Securities Exchange Acts of
1933 and 1934 increased the disclosure requirements of publicly
listed firms and increased the auditor’s liability for fraudulent
statements. While the effect and intent of such legislation on
the stock markets is subject to debate [Benston, 1973; Merino
and Neimark, 1982; Cooper and Keim, 1983; Tinker, 1984], its
impact on the U.S. auditing profession is less controversial. The
audit profession emerged from the Depression with a statutory
demand for its services, revised audit objectives (i.e., the change
in focus from the balance sheet to the income statement and the
greater emphasis on the “fairness” of the financial statements
rather than the accuracy of their tracking of transactions), and
greater liability for misleading financial statements [Gilman,
1939].
In countries of the British Commonwealth, audited financial statements were required by statute well before the De
pression (1844 in the U.K., 1907 in Canada). In these countries,
there was no immediate legislative response to the financial
reporting issues exposed by the Depression. Nonetheless, the
Depression also coincides with changes in the practice of auditing in these countries [Chandler et al., 1993]. In the U.K., the
1931 Royal Mail Steam Packet Case, where secret reserves were
used to hide deteriorating performance, is widely credited with
increasing the emphasis on the income statement and the qual
See Lieberman [2001] for a discussion of periodization strategies including
the “exogenous shock” approach used here.
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ity of earnings, although an audited income statement was not
required by law in the U.K. until 1947 [Edwards, 1989]. Similarly in Canada, there is evidence of a change in auditing practice
even though the disclosure of audited income statements was
not required until 1951 as a professional standard and 1953 as a
matter of legislation [Anderson, 1977, p. 10]. In these countries,
then, changes in the demand for audit services were played out
in the marketplace and professional practice rather than being
brought about explicitly through regulation.
This paper explores the relationship between the Great
Depression and patterns of auditor switching and continuity in
Canada based on a sample of audited financial statements dated
between 1910 and 1941. The Depression in Canada was as severe as that in the U.S. [De Long, 1997], but this setting provides
an opportunity to observe the relationship between the Depression and changes in behavior of the audit market in the absence
of changes in government regulation of auditing coincident with
that event.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the
contemporary literature on auditor switching is reviewed. This
review suggests that the Depression may have had contrary effects on the supply and demand sides of the audit market. On
the demand side, four explanatory models of auditor switching
each suggest that clients should prefer larger, better reputation
auditors when the demand for credible financial information
increases. On the supply side, the literature suggests that as the
financial risks of clients increase, auditors should be more likely
to resign in order to maintain a profitable portfolio of lower risk
clients. The institutional context of the Canadian audit market
between 1910 and 1941 is then discussed to identify which of
these models may apply in this setting. This is followed by a
description of the data used and presentation of an analysis of
auditor continuity and switching behavior before and during the
Depression. The paper ends with a discussion and some historical speculation on the results.
PRIOR LITERATURE AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
The audit market is highly differentiated with a wide range
of sizes of audit firms as well as audit firm specialization in geographic and industry-specific markets [Yardley et al., 1992]. The
decision by a client to hire or retain an auditor and the decision
by the auditor to accept or retain a client is a complex process
subject to many variables. The sections below review the domiPublished by eGrove, 2006
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nant supply and demand side theories of auditor switching in
the contemporary literature.
The Demand for Audit Services: Our understanding of the dynamics of the audit market is largely based on data from the last
30 years in the U.S. This stream of research was triggered by the
1976 U.S. Senate’s investigation into the “accounting establishment” [Metcalfe, 1976]. The report documented the growing
concentration of the supply of audit services to publicly traded
companies by a small group of audit firms and their influence
on the standard-setting process. It was not clear, however,
whether this oligopoly was a result of market forces or uncompetitive behavior by the firms. The report lead to a series of studies that examined such things as the pricing of audit services
[Simunic, 1980], the initial choice of auditors by firms [Simunic
and Stein, 1987], and the pattern of auditor switches, the subject of this paper. The argument was made that if audit pricing,
auditor choice, and auditor switches could be explained by economically reasonable matching of the characteristics of auditors
and clients, then the structure of the industry could be attributed to competitive market forces rather than to attempts by the
firms to gain monopoly power.
This paper focuses on the pattern of auditor switching and
continuity. The dominant pattern identified in contemporary
literature has been a persistent shift of clients from small to
large audit firms. There are four explanations for this pattern.
First, clients may be using the reputation for quality of the
larger firms to increase the credibility of their financial statements [DeFond, 1992; Teoh and Wong, 1993; Colbert, 1998]. In
the face of uncertainty about the possible quality of auditors,
a “brand name” may signal better monitoring of management
reporting and lower agency costs. In order for this mechanism
to be operative, the brand-name effect must be stronger than the
quality effect provided by licensure and the minimum education
standards required as a prerequisite for licensure. This effect is
also consistent with “premium” pricing for the services of larger
firms in competitive markets [Francis, 1984; Bandyopadhyay
and Kao, 2001].
Second, clients may be relying on the “deep pockets” of
large audit firms and liberal liability laws to provide insurance
to potential users of financial statements in the event of an audit
(or business) failure [Beatty, 1993; Menon and Williams, 1994].
The extent to which audit firms have been held liable for damages to clients and third parties varies across countries and across
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol33/iss2/4
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time. The large firms have claimed that there is a liability crisis
in auditing [cf., Freedman, 1993; Schuetze, 1993]. They suggest
that the audit market may collapse if auditors are exposed to
claims from all potential users of financial statements if there
are no limits on the extent of their liability. These arguments
lead to calls for proportionate liability and incorporation of professional practices as means of limiting liability [Kirby, 1997].
This explanation appears to be particularly relevant to the U.S.
where third party liability and class action suits against auditors
are more likely to hold.
Third, there may be economies of scale or scope in the audit market such that larger audit firms can produce services at
lower cost than smaller firms [Francis and Stokes, 1986]. The
economy of scale argument implies that there is a pool of fixed
costs associated with the operation of the audit firm. These costs
may include the costs of administration, research, information
systems, and the fixed costs associated with the complement of
partners of the firm. If there are economies of scale, clients may
switch to larger audit firms as they grow in order to take advantage of audit efficiencies. The economies of scope argument
implies that the audit firm can supply multiple services to a
client less expensively than several firms supplying each service
independently [AICPA, 1997]. The economy of scope argument
usually links information flows from the audit to management
consulting [cf., Shu, 2000]. If there are economies of scope, a
client may switch auditors as its needs for non-audit services grow to allow one firm to provide both sets of services.
Note, however, that economies of scope may involve offsetting
problems associated with maintaining the independence of the
audit.
Finally, if the audit is indivisible, clients may need to switch
to larger firms as they grow to get the service they require [Benston, 1979; Chan, 1995]. Doogar and Easley [1998] demonstrate
that the existing distribution of the sizes of audit firms can be
derived from the distribution of the sizes of client firms using
this assumption. This may apply to the need for the audit firm
to provide service over an extended geographic range or to the
size of the audit team required to complete the work on a timely
basis. For example, Richardson [2001] notes that the change
in strategy of Canadian banks from raising money from commercial term deposits and share subscriptions to reliance on demand deposits resulted in an expanded retail banking network
that many smaller audit firms could not service.
We will consider the relevance of these theories to the
Published by eGrove, 2006

5

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 33 [2006], Iss. 2, Art. 4
44

Accounting Historians Journal, December 2006

c urrent study; i.e., the time period surrounding the Great
Depression in Canada, after reviewing contemporary theory
concerned with the supply of audit services.
The Supply of Audit Services: The literature examining the supply of audit services is of more recent origin. It can be dated to
the bankruptcy of the audit firm Laventhol and Horvath in the
U.S. in 1990. At that time it was the seventh largest audit firm in
the U.S. but was unable to bear the costs of litigation of charges
of negligence in a number of business failures during the 1980s.
This event highlighted the importance to audit firms of managing the riskiness of their portfolios of clients (i.e., the business
risk to the audit firm in addition to the risk of rendering an
incorrect audit opinion [audit risk]) [cf., Brumfield et al., 1983;
Jubb et al., 1996]. Subsequent research has demonstrated that
audit firms take the riskiness of clients into account in setting
their fees and respond to changes in business risks by adjusting
their portfolios of clients away from those facing liquidity and
solvency problems [Krishnan and Krishnan, 1997; Jones and
Raghunandan, 1998; Johnstone and Bedard, 2004].
Shu [2000] documents that clients whose auditors resigned
were more likely to move to a smaller audit firm. This would
occur if the risks of litigation/reputation loss are less to smaller
firms if the smaller firms have different risk tolerances than
larger firms, or if smaller firms were industry specialists with superior knowledge of business risks [Menon and Williams, 1999;
DeFond et al., 2000]. This literature thus suggests that in times
of increased business risk, large audit firms will protect their
reputations by resigning from, not renewing, or refusing engagements where they are unable to assess or manage the business
risk.
The Canadian Institutional Environment: This section reviews
the Canadian institutional environment to identify the demand
and supply issues noted in the theoretical literature that are
most likely to affect auditor switching and continuity in the period prior to the World War II in Canada. First, the reputation
or quality differences among firms are likely to be larger during
this period than in contemporary studies. Licensing requirements for public accountants were not instituted until 1946 in
Canada, beginning in Quebec. This means that there were no
minimum quality standards for auditors during the pre-Depression or Depression periods. In addition, the audit market was
considerably less concentrated, and the number of audit firms
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol33/iss2/4
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active in the market was larger than is the case in many contemporary markets [Danos and Eichenseher, 1986; Richardson,
2001]. It is reasonable, therefore, to assume that the variation in
quality among auditors in this period was greater than usually
encountered in contemporary auditor switching studies.
Second, the auditors’ exposure to legal liability is signifi
cantly less in Commonwealth countries than in the U.S. [Anderson, 1977, p. 95; Baker, 1996]. The common law exempts
auditors from liability to third parties under the strict privity
of contract doctrine. This doctrine was first introduced into the
area of auditors’ legal liability by the Ultramares case in the
early 1930s [Ultramares v. Touche 174 N.E. 441 N.Y. 1931]. Although this case was tried in the U.S., it is widely cited in U.K.
and Canadian courts. In the U.S., this doctrine has been superseded by the liability provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Securities
Acts for listed companies. More recently, some states have also
applied broader liability rules based on the Restatement of Torts
(Second) Section 522 or by the “reasonably foreseeable” doctrine introduced in Rosenblum [In. v. Adler 461 A.2d 138 N.J.
1983]. In the Canadian environment, and particularly during
the period examined, the auditor’s liability for negligence was
limited to the client.
Even though the risk of litigation was relatively lower than
at present, audit firms sought to avoid financially distressed
clients to protect their reputations and the stability of their fee
income. Cowperthwaite [1986, p. 22], for example, notes that
both Peat Marwick and Price Waterhouse refused to audit stock
brokerages during the Depression because of their financial
condition and the low reputation in which some stock brokerage firms were held. He also notes that an unsuccessful lawsuit
against the firm during this period resulted in the loss of clients
because of the suggestion that the firm had failed in its duties
[Cowperthwaite, 1986����������������������������������������
, p. 4].
�����������������������������������
There was a need to manage the
business risk faced by the audit firm and to protect the audit
firm’s reputation.
A methodological note is in order at this point. In contemporary tests of the auditor client-portfolio adjustment hypothesis, researchers partition their sample into those clients
that are���������������������������������������������������������
experiencing financial distress and those that are not.
This partitioning is based on financial statement accounts. Two
problems prevent this approach in this paper. First, the required
financial disclosures by firms in Canada during this period were
limited to the balance sheet. While some firms disclosed income
statements, it was not common practice and such statements
Published by eGrove, 2006
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were unaudited. Thus, it is impossible to partition firms on the
basis of earnings. Second, it is well documented that during this
period, a firm experiencing financial downturns might use secret
reserves to maintain the appearance of a sound balance sheet
and to pay dividends [Bliss, 1987, p. 424]. This practice usually became public knowledge only if the firm ultimately failed.
Consequently, it is inadvisable to examine the effect of the financial condition of particular client firms on auditor switching
based on published financial statements. In addition, the cause
of auditor switches was not disclosed during this period so the
competing explanations presented above cannot be differentiated directly by the reason for the switch. The Great Depression,
however, affected all sectors of the economy [cf., Urquhart and
Buckley, 1965], and, hence, it is reasonable to assume that there
were supply-side adjustments across the entire pattern of auditor switches.
Third, the potential for economies of scale was very limited
at this time. Auditing during this period was a labor-intensive
process; the use of statistical sampling and computer-aided audits did not occur until well after World War II. The main basis
for economies of scale was the use of junior staff to undertake
audit procedures. This source of leverage was equally available
to all but the smallest audit firms and is unlikely to have given
any subset of the firms in this sample a comparative advantage.
The same can be said of the potential for economies of scope.
During this period, the firms’ main lines of business were auditing and, after World War I, tax advice [Little, 1964; Jones, 1981].
The contemporary arguments about economies of scope rely on
the transfer of information between the audit and consulting
functions [Shu, 2000]. Although management consulting practice can be dated to the development of scientific management
in the early 1900s, it really did not become a significant business
until after World War II [Mellett, 1988].
Fourth, it is possible that auditor switching was related to
the size and reputation of audit firms. The reputation of the
audit firm, or the quality of the audit performed, has frequently
been inferred by its dominance of the market [Davidson and
Neu, 1993]. The large audit firms (the Big-Eight, Six, or Five
depending on the time period of the study) are usually regarded

Other techniques included misreporting loans as equity [e.g., in the railroad
industry, Thomson, 1938] and using alternative valuation bases to avoid writedowns on securities [e.g., in the financial services sector, Bliss, 1988, pp. 416424].
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as being equal in quality and differentiated from smaller audit
firms [Francis and Simon, 1987; Beatty, 1993]. This assumption
has been validated by showing that these firms are paid a premium for their services in competitive markets [Francis, 1984;
Bandyopadhyay and Kao, 2001].
Francis and Simon [1987] explicitly test for and do not find
a price premium for second-tier (“national”) audit firms in their
sample. Their work suggests that the contemporary reputation
effect in auditing is limited to the “brand name,” international
accounting firms. Contrary to this, Krishnan and Schauer [2000]
find that audit quality, measured as compliance with GAAP
among non-profit organizations, is also related to the size of
firm among non-Big-Six firms. DeFond et al. [2000] find both
discount and premium pricing among specialist audit firms.
These results suggest that reputation/quality may be reflected by
the large international audit firms but that size may also affect
the perceived and/or actual quality of audits beyond this group
of firms.
In Canada during this period, both international and Canadian firms held positions as market leaders while some of the
international firms that dominate other markets were minor
suppliers in this market (e.g., Deloitte, Ernst) [Matthews et al.,
1998, pp. 46-47 for a ranking of U.K. firms; McKee and Garner,
1992, p. 14 for a ranking of U.S. firms during this period]. In
this study, the six largest firms include three Canadian firms and
three “international” firms, originating in either the U.K. or the
U.S. These firms are at least 20% larger than their closest rivals.
This situation allows us to observe the effects of size, quality defined by local market share, and international reputation defined
by membership in the set of dominant international firms independently.
Overall, the audit market environment at this time suggests
that auditor switching by clients may have been related to the
reputation/quality auditors or by a desire to lower the cost of
their audit through the use of larger auditors. Simultaneously,
audit firms were concerned about the effect of client failure
on their reputations and the stability of their income streams.
These factors are assumed to affect the entire period but to have
different weights in the pre-Depression versus Depression periods as discussed below. There will also be auditor switches for
other reasons such as price and opinion shopping, death and
retirement of auditor partners, etc. These factors are assumed
to be randomly distributed across time and are unlikely to be
systematically related to the occurrence of the Great Depression.
Published by eGrove, 2006
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These factors, however, may be systematically related to the
size of the audit firm and, hence, would explain the consistently
higher rate of switches among small audit firms.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The literature suggests that the market for audits fundamentally changed after the Great Depression due to a greater
emphasis on the earnings capacity of the firm and greater reliance on audited financial statements as the indicator of that capacity. This shift increased the importance of auditor reputation
to clients. The Depression also resulted in a sudden, but temporary, shift in the risk profile of many clients, providing incentives
for auditors to realign their portfolios of clients to manage their
business risk. Since there is a discontinuity in the nature of the
demand for and supply of audits, we hypothesize that the distribution of clients over categories of auditor will be affected.
Based on the contemporary literature on auditor switching, we
expect that the pattern of auditor switches will be related to
the local market share (size) and/or international status/reputation of the audit firms involved in the switches. The theoretical
literature and contemporary evidence suggest that prior to the
Depression, the pattern of auditor switching should favor large
international firms. The auditor switching literature, however,
does not provide a theoretical basis for predicting the direction
of the change in auditor switching behavior during the Depression.
Given the discussion above, we test a non-directional hypothesis about the change in the pattern of auditor switches
during the Depression (in alternative form):
H1 The pattern of auditor switching among categories of audit firms in Canada will differ during the
Great Depression compared with the pre-Depression period.
In addition to testing this hypothesis, we explore the pattern
of auditor switches for evidence of consistencies in the average
flow of clients among categories of auditors under different circumstances from which can be inferred the relative reputation
of large international and Canadian audit firms (and others)
during this period.
Data: The paper is based on financial statements published in
The Annual Financial Review, Canadian [Briggs and Houston]

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol33/iss2/4
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at five-year intervals from 1906 to 1941. The Review was published between 1902 and 1941, when it ceased publication. It
presented a summary of the annual reports of major Canadian
firms through this time period. The summary included the main
financial statement information and the names of key officers.
It did not include the auditors’ certificate and, prior to 1906,
did not disclose the name of the auditor, if any. This series has
been used as a source of information about Canadian financial
reporting practices in the absence of archives of early Canadian
annual reports [Murphy, 1988; Richardson, 2001].
In order to be included in the sample, financial statements
for each company were required for at least two periods along
with the reported name of the auditor. These criteria yielded
1,836 financial statements from 492 firms. In order to observe
auditor changes or continuity, the first observation from each
series (492 financial statements) is dropped. The sample generates 1,344 temporally ordered pairs of financial statements that
include 310 cases where clients switched auditors. Switches involved 195 client firms with 1.59 as the mean number of switches per firm and a standard deviation of 0.9. The data were divided into two sets using 1930 as the dividing line. This resulted
in 648 financial statements from 383 firms for the pre-Depression period, including 186 auditor changes involving 133 firms,
and 696 financial statements from 418 firms for the Depression
period, including 124 auditor changes involving 103 firms. A
supplementary analysis, described below, focuses on those 167
firms that appeared in both periods.
To facilitate analysis, the audit firms were divided into three
categories based on their market share throughout the entire
period and their country of origin based on the method used
in Richardson [2001]. The market is concentrated with the six
largest firms accounting for 45% of all audits. Further, there is a
discrete break between the sixth largest and seventh largest firm

The firms used represent those cases where there were (1) at least two financial statements available and (2) the auditor was listed. A total of 3,661 financial
statements were included in the source material.

The disclosure of the auditor in this series coincides with debates leading to
the statutory requirement for audited balance sheets added to the Ontario Companies Act in 1907.

The Great Depression is usually dated from the stock market crash in October 1929. The first financial statements impacted by the Depression would have
appeared in 1930.

Some firms appear in both periods so the number of firms in the sub-periods
does not equal the overall number of firms.

Published by eGrove, 2006
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(the sixth largest is almost 20% larger than the seventh largest)
so that it is reasonable to treat these six firms as a distinct group.
The largest firms include three Canadian firms (Clarkson, Ross,
and Riddell) and three international firms (Price Waterhouse,
Touche, and Peat Marwick). These subgroups are identified as
the Canadian Big-3 and the International Big-3 in the analyses.
The remaining firms are referenced to as “Other.”
For each financial statement pair, we identified in the database the categories of the initial auditor and the auditor of the
subsequent set of financial statements. For the subsequent auditor, an additional category of “no change” was added to allow us
to examine patterns of continuity as well as patterns of switches
in the data. We also separated the financial statements into two
categories based on the year-end as being in either the pre-Depression (before 1930) or Depression (1930 and after). The data
are thus captured in a 3x4x2 (initial auditor * subsequent auditor * time period) contingency table.
Analyses: To explore the distribution of observations among the
cells in the matrix described above, we specify the following
saturated model:
log misd = µ + λI + λS+ λD +λIS +λID + λSD + λISD
Where:
• m = cell frequency for a given combination of I, S, and D
(indexed by i, s, and d)
• µ = the logarithm of the mean cell frequency across all
conditions
• λ = a parameter to be estimated (the increase/decrease in
cell frequency due to I, S, D and their interactions)
• I = auditor category in the initial period
• S = auditor category in the subsequent period
• D = the time period (either Depression or pre-Depression
time period)
The model was estimated using hierarchical log linear
analysis. This technique is appropriate for categorical data as it
requires no assumptions about the distribution of variables and
does not require a specification of the direction of relationships.
Given H1, we use this model to test for a significant three-way
interaction (I*S*D); i.e., does the pattern of switches between

The original coding separated “Other Canadian”
������������������������������������
and “Other International”
depending on their country of origin. Due to the small numbers of clients of “Other International” in the data, these two categories were combined for analysis.
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categories of auditors change between the pre-Depression and
Depression periods? The results are shown in Table 1. Based on
a likelihood ratio chi-square, we observe a significant loss of categorization ability if the three-way interaction is dropped from
the model (LR Chi-square = 18.6, p<0.05). From this result, we
conclude that H1 is supported.
TABLE 1
Analysis of Patterns of Auditor Continuity and Switching
Model: log misd = µ + λI + λS+ λD +λIS +λID + λSD + λISD
Where:
• µ = the logarithm of the mean cell frequency across all conditions
• λ = a parameter
• m = cell frequency for a given combination of I, S and D (indexed by i, s,
and d)
• I = auditor category in the initial period (International Big-3, Canadian
Big-3, and Other)
• S = the auditor category in the subsequent period (no change, International Big-3,
• Canadian Big-3, and Other)
• D = the time period (either Depression or pre-Depression time period)
H1:	���������������������������������������������������������������������������
the pattern of auditor switching among categories of audit firms in Canada
will differ during the Great Depression compared with the pre-depression
period������������������������������������������������������������
(the three-way interaction between I, S, and D is not zero)
Tests that K-way and higher order effects are zero (n=1,344).
K Model

DF

L.R. Chi-square

Probability

3 log misd = µ + λI + λS+ λD +λIS +λID + λSD
2 log misd = µ + λI + λS+ λD
1 log misd = µ

6
17
23

18.582
163.294
2,160.622

.0049
.0000
.0000

Partial Chi-square

Probability

Tests of partial associations
Effect Name

DF

Initial auditor*Time period λ
Initial auditor*Subsequent auditor λIS
Subsequent auditor*Time period λSD
Initial auditor λI
Subsequent auditor λS
Time period λD
ID

6
2
3
2
3
1

97.936
11.958
17.301
263.184
1,732.429
1.715

.0000
.0025
.0006
.0000
.0000
.1904

The results also show that the main effects, with the exception of “D,” and the two-way interactions are statistically
significant. Although these results are not of direct relevance to
Published by eGrove, 2006
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the hypothesis, they are discussed here for completeness. The
lack of significance of “D” (the time period) simply means there
is no significant difference in the number of observations in the
pre-Depression and Depression periods. The significant main effects on “I” (the initial auditor) and “S” (the subsequent auditor)
means that clients were not evenly distributed across categories
of auditors. The significant two-way interactions mean that (a)
auditor switching changed the distribution of clients across
categories of auditors over the entire period (I*S), (b) the distribution of clients across categories of initial auditors differed
between time periods (I*D), and (c) the distribution of clients
across categories of subsequent auditors differed between time
periods (S*D). The significant three-way interaction, noted
above, controls for all of these effects.
Table 2 provides a tabular summary of the data. Panel A
shows the pattern of continuity and auditor switches among
classes of audit firms during the pre-Depression period. This
panel shows that there was less client turnover among the large
firms than smaller firms during this period and that the international audit firms had the lowest rate of turnover. The lower section of Panel A provides the distribution of switches among categories of auditors during the pre-Depression period. Consistent
with contemporary studies, the large international firms were
gaining clients through switches (e.g., 3.2% of switches were
away from the Big-3 international firms, but 18.8% of switches
were to Big-3 International firms from other categories of auditors). Similarly, the Big-3 Canadian firms were gaining clients
through switches (11.8% vs. 12.9%). The small firms were, on
average, losing clients through switches during this period
(84.9% vs. 68.3%).
Panel B of Table 2 provides the same data for the Depression
period. Two changes are evident; first, there is significantly less
turnover among small audit firm clients although total turnover
has increased. Second, the direction of switches among auditor
categories has changed. The Big-3 international firms were, on
average, losing clients through switches during the Depression

Some changes in auditor from one class to another may have been associated
with mergers between accounting firms. We assume that these represent choice
points for the auditor and client about whether or not to change categories of auditor and are, in principle, no different than any other auditor switching event.

The significance of individual cells is based on a test of the Pearson residuals
comparing the observed data and a model assuming independence of the three
factors used in the log linear model [�����������������������������������������������
Friendly, 1994]��������������������������������
. All references to significant
results are based on a p<0.05.
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TABLE 2
Auditor Continuity and Switches
Panel A: Auditor Continuity and Switches during the Pre-Depression Period
Pre-Depression Sample

Initial International
Auditor
Big-3
Canadian
Big- 3
Other
Full Sample

Auditor in Subsequent Period
No Change International Canadian Other
Big-3
Big-3
Percentage within Initial Auditor
95.6%

1.5%

0.7%

2.2%

100%

81.2%

6.8%

2.6%

9.4%

100%

59.9%
71.3%

6.3%
5.4%

5.1%
3.7%

28.7%
19.6%

100%
N = 648
% Client
Losses

Percentage of Auditor Switches
Initial International
1.1%
0.5%
1.6%
Auditor
Big-3
Canadian
4.3%
1.6%
5.9%
Big- 3
Other
13.4%
10.8%
61.1%
% Client
18.8%
12.9%
68.3%
Gains
Panel B: Auditor Continuity and Switches during the Depression
Depression Sample

Initial International
Auditor
Big-3
Canadian
Big- 3
Other
% of Sample

Total

Auditor in Subsequent Period
No Change International Canadian Other
Big-3
Big-3
Percentage within Initial Auditor

3.2%
11.8%
84.9%
N = 186

Total

89.8%

1.9%

3.9%

4.4%

100%

84.8%

2.6%

0.7%

11.9%

100%

76.4%
82.2%

3.5%
2.9%

5.0%
3.7%

15.02%
11.2%

100%
N = 696
% Client
Losses

Percentage of Auditor Switches
Initial International
3.2%
6.5%
Auditor
Big- 3
Canadian
3.2%
0.8%
Big- 3
Other
9.7%
14.7%
% Client
16.1%
21.0%
Gains
Panel C: Changes in the Pattern of Auditor Switches
(Depression – Pre-Depression Periods)

7.3%

16.9%

14.5%

18.6%

41.1%

64.5%

62.9%

N = 124

Changes in the Percentage of
Auditor Switches (Depression
– Pre-depression)
Initial International
Auditor
Big- 3
Canadian
Big- 3
Other
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2.2%

5.9%

5.6%

-1.1%

-0.8%

8.6%

-3.8%

3.0%

-19.6%
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while small audit firms were less likely to suffer clients switching. Panel C of Table 2 provides a summary of the changes.
Of particular significance are the cells above the diagonal in
the matrix in Panel C of Table 2. These cells capture the change
in the flow of clients among categories of audit firms during
the Depression. All these changes are positive and statistically
significant indicating that during the Depression, there was an
increase in switches from International Big-3 firms to the Big-3
Canadian firms and “Other” firms (changes of 5.9% and 5.6% respectively) and from Canadian Big-3 firms to “Others” (a change
of 8.6%) when compared to the pre-Depression period.
The second analysis, reported below, uses those firms in the
data base for which at least one financial statement is available
both before and during the Depression. The additional restrictions reduce the sample size and hence the power of the tests,
but this subset of the data allows each firm to act as its own
control to remove possible effects due to changes in industry
composition between the two periods, possible survivorship
bias, and other factors associated with the change in client populations. This sample includes 167 firms generating 779 temporally ordered pairs of financial statements. There are 189 auditor
switches among this group, 118 from the pre-Depression period
involving 80 firms (based on 444 pairs of financial statements)
and 71 from the post-1930 period involving 54 firms (based on
331 pairs of financial statements).
The hierarchical log linear analysis results for these data
are consistent with those reported above. There is a significant
three-way interaction effect (LR Chi-square 12.1, d.f.=6, p<0.06,
N=779) indicating that the pattern of auditor switches changed
between the pre-Depression and Depression periods. The pattern of auditor switches in this sample is also consistent with
the results from the full sample described above. In particular
also, the bottom panel of Table 3 shows that the changes in percentage of switches above the diagonal are again all positive,
indicating an increased flow of clients from Big-3 International
firms to Big-3 Canadian firms and smaller firms during the Depression.
DISCUSSION
The data provide evidence that there was a statistically
significant change in the pattern of auditor switching during
the Depression compared with the pre-Depression period in
Canada. In the pre-Depression period, as well as for the entire
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol33/iss2/4
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TABLE 3
Auditor Continuity and Switches
(Firms in Both the Pre-Depression
and Depression Samples)
Panel A: Auditor Continuity and Switches during the Pre-Depression Period
Auditor in Subsequent Period
PreInternational Canadian Other
Total
No
Change
Depression Sample
Big-3
Big-3
Percentage within Initial Auditor
Initial International
95.1%
1.0%
1.0%
2.9%
100%
Auditor
Big-3
Canadian
85.7%
6.5%
0%
7.8%
100%
Big-3
Other
61.5%
5.7%
6.4%
26.4%
100%
% of Sample
73.4%
4.7%
4.1%
17.8% N = 444
Client
Percentage of Auditor Switches %Losses
Initial International
0.8%
0.8%
2.5%
4.3%
Auditor
Big-3
Canadian
4.2%
0%
5.1%
9.3%
Big-3
Other
12.7%
14.4%
59.3%
86.4%
% Client
19.2%
14.6%
66.2% N = 118
Gains
Panel B: Auditor Continuity and Switches during the Depression
Depression Sample
Auditor in Subsequent Period
Total
No Change International Canadian Other
Big-3
Big-3
Percentage within Initial Auditor
Initial International
89.2%
2.9%
4.9%
2.9%
100%
Auditor
Big-3
Canadian
79.0%
3.2%
1.6%
16.2%
100%
Big-3
Other
73.0%
2.2%
5.4%
19.5%
100%
% of Sample
78.6%
2.7%
4.8%
13.9% N = 335
Client
Percentage of Auditor Switches %Losses
Initial International
4.2%
7.0%
4.2%
15.4%
Auditor
Big-3
Canadian
2.8%
1.4%
14.1%
18.3%
Big-3
Other
5.6%
14.1%
46.5%
66.2%
% Client
12.7%
22.5%
64.8%
N = 71
Gains
Panel C: Changes in the Pattern of Auditor Switches
(Depression – Pre-Depression Periods)
Changes in the Percentage of
Auditor Switches (Depression
– Pre-depression)
Initial International
3.4%
6.2%
1.7%
Auditor
Big-3
Canadian
-1.4%
14.0%
9.0%
Big-3
Other
-7.1%
0.3%
-12.8%
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sample, including both period observations, we see the pattern
of auditor switching that is identified in contemporary studies.
Large firms, particularly large international firms, on average
gain clients due to auditor switches. Furthermore, there were
significantly more switches from large Canadian firms to large
international firms during this period than vice versa (4.3%
versus 0.5% of switches) and significantly more switches from
“Others” to the large firms than vice versa (24.2% versus 7.5% of
switches combining the two large-firm categories). This pattern
of switches supports the inference that the large international
audit firms were preferred, on average, to Canadian audit firms
by those clients who switched auditors. Also, large audit firms
were generally preferred to small audit firms by those clients
who switched auditors. The models reviewed above suggest that
this could occur if the large international firms had a better reputation than large Canadian firms and large Canadian firms had
a better reputation than smaller firms (“Others”).
In the Depression period, the pattern of auditor switches
is reversed for the large international firms. During this period,
large international firms, on average, lost more clients to large
Canadian firms than they gained due to switches (6.5% versus
3.2%) and lost clients overall due to auditor switches. This does
not imply that the large international firms were contracting
during this period since growth can also occur through the
growth of existing clients or through new client firms entering
the market. The large Canadian firms gained clients, on average, during this period while the small firms lost clients due to
switches but at a significantly lower rate than during the preDepression period.
If the relative reputation of audit firms remained the same
throughout this time period, then this reversal of the net flow of
clients may be explained by the effect of the Great Depression
on the relationship between clients and audit firms. The change
in the pattern of auditor switching over the period examined is
consistent with the following explanation. Prior to the Depression, the expanding capital markets created competition for
funds, and large audit firms benefited by being seen as increasing the quality and credibility to financial statements compared
with small firms. During the Depression, while this was undoubtedly still an issue, audit firms were adjusting their portfolio of clients and/or refusing certain new clients to manage their
business risk. This would explain a shift from large international
firms to large Canadian firms if the Canadian firms had better
knowledge of local conditions and, hence, could better manage
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol33/iss2/4
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the business risk of some clients that the large international
firms felt were too risky. This aggregate result is consistent with
Cowperthwaite’s [1986, p. 22] observation that two of the Big-3
International firms (Peat Marwick and Price Waterhouse) refused to audit stockbrokers during the Depression. For this class
of clients at least, the international firms were withdrawing their
services because of increased business and reputation risks.
Alternative Explanations: There are at least three possible counter explanations to the interpretation offered here for the observed pattern of auditor switching. First, it may be possible
that the Depression encouraged client firms to become more
price sensitive in their selection of audit firms (i.e., changes in
the elasticity of demand). Second, it may be the case that the
Depression resulted in the downsizing of client firms such that
their needs were now better met by using the services of smaller
audit firms. Finally, the pattern of switches may reflect changes
in the pattern of mergers among audit firms over this period.
Each of these alternatives is discussed below.
The first alternative concerns possible price effects during
the Depression. Unfortunately, no data are available concerning
the pricing of audit services during this period. Theoretically,
however, the shift of clients among auditors due to Depressioninduced price competition is unlikely. Price competition may
have already affected the distribution of clients, but no new effects are anticipated due to the Depression. First, if the relative
prices of audits from different categories of audit firms remain
constant, then no shifts in demand should occur. There is no a
priori reason to assume that the price deflation during the Depression should impact all professional firms equally. In fact, if
auditors with better reputations are earning higher than average
returns, then presumably they are better able to meet price competition if this becomes a factor. Second, the demand for professional services has been found to be relatively income inelastic
[e.g., less than 1, cf., Houthakker and Taylor, 1970]. In other
words, the demand for a certain level of audit quality may be determined by extrinsic factors such as regulatory and stakeholder
requirements and is less affected by the income available to the
firm to purchase these services.
The second alternative explanation concerns possible changes in the size of clients during the Depression. The possibility of
changes in the demographic composition of clients has been
addressed partially through the research design. Sample 2 uses
firms as their own control for both periods. This appears to have
Published by eGrove, 2006
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been a successful control for size. The firms that switched auditors do not differ significantly in reported total assets (p=0.54).
The firms that did not switch auditors groups also do not differ
significantly in terms of reported assets (p=0.86). Furthermore,
the firms that switched auditors did not differ significantly from
those that did not switch auditors in either the pre-Depression
(p=0.53) or Depression groups (p=0.80). Changes in client demographics are unlikely to explain the changing pattern of auditor
switches.
Finally, the pattern observed could reflect changes in the
pattern of audit firm mergers specifically if the larger firms were
engaged in more mergers prior to the Depression than afterwards and client firms continued with the merged firm after the
merger, thus creating the appearance of auditor switching to
larger firms. We have already argued that the client’s choice of
an auditor and the merged firm’s decision to retain a client are
no different, in principle, during a merger than at other times.
Unfortunately, there is little data on the pattern of audit firm
mergers in Canada during this period so this alternative cannot
be ruled out directly. One counter indicator is Collard [1983]
who provides a list of mergers affecting both the Ross and
Touche audit firms in Canada. Only one merger is reported during the period covered in this study, occurring in 1919. In terms
of the data analyzed here, the number of audit firms represented
in the data by year does not change significantly between the
pre-Depression and Depression periods (pre-Depression, average
= 91.3 accounting firms, s.d. = 9.6; Depression, average = 86, s.d.
= 8, p<0.5). It appears unlikely that this effect could explain the
results.
CONCLUSION
This paper uses the Great Depression as a setting to explore the dynamics of the market for audit services in Canada
in the face of an exogenous shock to normal patterns of auditor switching. The theoretical literature suggested two possible
associations between the Depression and patterns of auditor
switches. First, it is possible that the increased importance of
financial statement quality and credibility during the Depression
could increase the association between the reputation and size
of audit firm and auditor switches, reflected in a higher proportion of auditor switches from small audit firms to large firms
and from Canadian audit firms to international audit firms.
Second, it is possible that the changes in the risk profile of audit
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol33/iss2/4
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clients during the Depression could create incentives for auditors to realign their portfolios to maintain profitability, resulting
in more switches from large, better reputation firms to smaller
firms or firms with a greater local knowledge of business risks.
The data support the hypothesis that there was a change in
the pattern of auditor switches during the Depression compared
with the pre-Depression period. In the Depression period (19301941), small Canadian audit firms were less likely to lose clients
to the international firms, and auditor switches were more likely
to result in clients moving to smaller and lower-status auditors,
reflected in an increase in switches from the International Big-3
to the Canadian Big-3 and in an increase in switches from the
Canadian Big-3 to “Other” Canadian firms. These results stand
in marked contrast with contemporary accounting switching
studies that show a consistent flow of clients to the large international firms. The data do not allow for tests of causal models,
but based on current theories of auditor switching, one explanation is that during the Depression the large international firms
withdrew from or denied services to risky client firms, allowing firms with higher risk tolerances or better knowledge of the
Canadian market to benefit. This aggregate result is consistent
with Cowperthwaite’s [1986, p. 22] observation that two of the
Big-3 International firms (Peat Marwick and Price Waterhouse)
refused to audit stockbrokers during the Depression. Several
alternative explanations were also ruled out on theoretical or
empirical grounds, but the cause of the shift in the pattern of
auditor switches in this period bears further investigation.
The period under consideration allows size and international reputation/status to be associated with auditor switching
decisions independently. The results show that in this setting
both factors are related to switching behavior, implying that
client firms could differentiate between Big-3 International
firms, Big-3 Canadian firms, and “Others.” In the pre-Depression period, both large Canadian firms and international firms
benefited from the movement of clients to larger firms. This
suggests that clients were able to differentiate between the large
and small Canadian firms. In the Depression period, the realignment of clients also provides evidence that clients differentiated
the international firms from larger and smaller Canadian firms.
There is an apparent flow of clients down this chain of firms and
an increase in the flow of clients directly from the International
Big-3 to the smaller Canadian firms. Taken together, the pattern
of auditor switches suggests that, even in this early stage of the
development of the Canadian audit market, international repuPublished by eGrove, 2006
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tation was more important than size in auditor choice decisions
but that size, reflected in local market share, was a factor in
such decisions.
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